We said the 2024-25 Federal Budget needed to do three things: not add to spending, unless offsetting it elsewhere; change existing policy to lower spending and find new revenue that will persist over time to close the structural balance; and put in place policies to assist the private sector to maximise productivity growth.
Unfortunately, we were left disappointed on all three fronts.
With billions being spilled into the economy from 1 July, and without offsetting new spending with cuts elsewhere, the Budget has thwarted the task of tightening the structural deficit.
It also undermines the Government’s inflation forecast – which was lowered below the Reserve Bank’s forecast and assumed to drop into the 2-3 per cent target band by the end of this year.
We are concerned the Budget doesn’t adequately account for the second-round impacts of the household assistance on spending. When combined with the personal income tax cuts, and cost-of-living measures currently being rolled out by state governments, we see a renewed threat to the core inflation.
Significant policy loosening quickly turns the estimated $9.3 billion surplus into a projected $28.3 billion deficit in 2024-25, as increases in spending are not matched to new receipts. The situation gets worse in 2025-26 as the cash deficit grows to $42.8 billion.
This is accompanied by a deterioration of the net debt projections, which rise from 18.6 per cent of GDP to 21.9 per cent of GDP by 2027-28.
Interest payments are expected to increase from 0.5 per cent to 0.8 per cent of GDP – and are in fact one of the fastest growing categories of spending, representing lost funds for other causes.
The structural budget deficit position is lower compared to the last projections from the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO). While this is subject to many assumptions, it is the best indication we have about the sustainability of fiscal settings. It suggests the changes to policy in the current budget actually increase our vulnerability to future shocks.
Although no significant policy reforms were expected, it does not take away from our disappointment in the lack of reform measures in this Budget, especially given Australia’s flailing productivity growth.
The changes put in place for business were insignificant compared to the spending on the household sector, with little to promote substantial ongoing reform to power up productivity.
On the upside, policy commitments that invested in workforce gaps were encouraging, including 20,000 additional fee-free TAFE and VET places to train construction workers. Measures to progress the Universities Accord were also welcome. These included small payments to students undertaking placements in teaching, nursing and social work, and a measure to get students university-ready.
On tax, incentives are mainly aimed at the resource-rich states of Western Australia and Queensland, with tax credits for Hydrogen Energy and Critical Minerals and, more broadly, an extension of the instant asset write-off for small businesses. The ATO received funding to pursue tax compliance activities – one of the few revenue-raising measures in the budget.
But these measures fall well short of the type of incentives we need to promote economy-wide, productivity-enhancing investments, or to help make Australia more internationally competitive – especially given our globally high corporate tax rate of 30 per cent.
With an election less than a year away, the Government failed to use its Budget narrative as a starting point to convince voters why a more ambitious reform agenda is needed in its second term.